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JUDICIAL ELECTION CANDIDATES' FREE SPEECH
RIGHTS AFTER REPUBLICAN PARTY OF MINNESOTA V
WHITE. IS THE PROBLEM REALLY SOLVED?
Alexa Green*
I. INTRODUCTION
The notion of judicial elections presents a paradoxical
quandary.' On one hand, we want to elect judges and be ade-
quately informed about the candidates so as to cast educated
votes.2 On the other hand, we want judges to be impartial
and devoid of prejudices.3
Information about executive and legislative candidates
usually comes from the candidates themselves in the form of
promises and commitments about what they will do if elected
into office.4 Judicial elections, however, are of a different
genre.5 A judge's role is to remain unbiased, hear both sides
of a case, and based on the facts and precedent at hand, issue
a ruling, thereby affording the litigants due process of the
law.6 There is concern that this requisite impartiality will be
eroded if a judge has previously made announcements about
* Technical Editor, Santa Clara Law Review, Volume 44. J.D. Candidate,
Santa Clara University School of Law; Bachelor of Arts, University of California
at Santa Cruz.
1. See Mark Kozlowski & Praveen Krishna, Freeing Candidate Speech in
Judicial Elections: Or, How Safe Are Loose Canons, Brennan Center for Justice
at N.Y.U. School of Law, at
http://www.brennancenter.org/programs/prog-htkelly-index.html (last visited
Sept. 13, 2003).
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 798 (2002) (Ste-
vens, J. dissenting).
6. Id.
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how he or she would rule if elected to the bench.7 As a result,
many states have adopted judicial canons which, among other
things, limit what judicial candidates may say while cam-
paigning.8 But if judicial candidates are prevented from dis-
cussing their views on legal and political issues, how can the
public make informed decisions when electing judges? In re-
cent years, several courts have grappled with this concern.9
To a certain extent, the United States Supreme Court
has recently resolved the issue of judicial candidates' free
speech rights.'" In Republican Party of Minnesota v. White,
the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a Min-
nesota rule" that forbids judicial candidates from announcing
their views on disputed legal or political issues ("the an-
nounce clause"). In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that the
provision violated the First Amendment." Because nearly all
states that hold judicial elections have adopted some version
of this rule, 4 the White decision will have a resounding effect
on judicial elections."
Although White ostensibly prevents the suppression of a
judicial candidate's right to express his or her views on mat-
ters of political and legal importance, the pledges or promises
clause, which forbids candidates from pledging or promising
7. See Kozlowski & Krishna, supra note 1.
8. See id.
9. See generally White, 536 U.S. at 765; Republican Party of Minn. v.
Kelly, 247 F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 2001); Buckley v. Ill. Jud. Inquiry Bd., 997.F.2d
224 (7th Cir. 1993); Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd., 944 F.2d 137 (3d Cir. 1991).
10. See White, 536 U.S. at 765.
11. MINN. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i)(2001). The text of
Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i) reads as follows:
(3) A candidate for a judicial office, including an incumbent judge:
(d) shall not:
(i) make pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the faithful
and impartial performance of the duties of the office; announce his or
her views on disputed legal or political issues; or misrepresent his or
her identity, qualifications, present position or other fact, or those of
the opponent.
12. See White, 536 U.S. at 767.
13. See id.
14. See Kozlowski & Krishna, supra note 1.
15. Seeid.
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certain results if elected, has the potential to preclude candi-
dates from exercising this right.16 If interpreted vaguely or
broadly, the pledges or promises clause has the capability of
rendering the eradication of the announce clause futile. 
17
Part II of this comment generally reviews the back-
ground of judicial elections and canons," examines the three
circuit court decisions which addressed the constitutionality
of the announce clause, 9 and discusses the Supreme Court's
holding in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White.2" Part III
summarizes the problem the pledges or promises clause pre-
sents as it relates to the Supreme Court's abolition of the an-
nounce clause.' Part IV analyzes the strengths and weak-
nesses of the majority and dissenting opinions in White.2 In
addition, it further discusses concerns regarding the possibil-
ity of broad or ambiguous interpretations of the pledges or
promises clause, as well as how such interpretations might
continue to impinge on judicial candidates' free speech
rights.2 Lastly, Part V proposes two possible solutions that
may have the potential to mitigate the harm the pledges or
promises clause threatens to create.
2 4
II. BACKGROUND
Although the federal judicial system appoints judges for
life, many states' have chosen to elect some or all of their
16. See Jan W. Baran, Judicial Candidate Speech Afier Republican Party of
Minnesota v. White, 39 CT. REV. 12, 12 (2002).
17. See id.
18. See infra Part II.A.
19. See infra Part II.B-E.
20. See infra Part II.F.
21. See infra Part III.
22. See infra Part IV.A-D.
23. See infra Part IV.F.
24. See infra Part V.A-C.
25. See Media Advisory, Brennan Center for Justice at N.Y.U. School of
Law, at http://www.brennancenter.org/programs/prog-ht-kellyindex.html (last
updated June 27, 2002). Eighty-seven percent of state judges face election, and
in thirty-eight states Supreme Court candidates must stand for election. Id. In
eighteen of these thirty-eight states, including Minnesota, high court seats are
filled through elections between competing candidates. Id. In sixteen others,
2003] 237
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judges for limited terms." Despite these differences in the
federal and state systems, both share the same goal: to create
and maintain an independent judiciary free from social and
political constraints.27 Consequently, in order to regulate
conduct in state judicial elections, most states have enacted
ethical canons based on the American Bar Association's
(ABA) Model Penal Code of Judicial Conduct." These canons
restrict the types of statements judicial candidates may make
during the campaign process.29
A. A Brief History ofJudicial Canons
In 1924, the ABA created the Canons of Judicial Ethics,"
consisting of thirty-six rules of professional conduct for
judges.1 In 1972, the ABA created the modern rules of judi-
cial ethics, known as the Model Code of Judicial Conduct.1
2
The revised Code contained seven canons, rather than the
thirty-six contained in the 1924 Code. 3 In 1990, the ABA
again revised the Model Code, reducing it to only five can-
ons.34 Most states with elected judiciaries have codified some
form of either the 1972 or the 1990 Model Code of Judicial
Conduct. 5
Justices are initially appointed, then face uncontested "retention elections" at
the end of their terms, where they must win at least a majority of votes to stay
in office. Id. Four other states use a mix of both systems. Id.
26. Katherine A. Moerke, Sacrificing Judicial Power on an Altar of Judicial
Independence: Republican Party of Minnesota v. Kelly, 35 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
47, 50 (2001).
27. See Republican Party of Minnesota v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854, 885 (8th Cir.
2001).
28. Moerke, supra note 26, at 50.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 52.
31. See Stephanie Cotilla & Amanda S. Veal, Judicial Balancing Act: The
Appearance of Impartiality and the First Amendment, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
741, 741 (2002).
32. Moerke, supra note 26, at 52.
33. Id.
34. Cotilla & Veal, supra note 31, at 742.
35. Moerke, supra note 26, at 53. Canon 1 of the 1990 Model Code states
that a judge shall uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary.
MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 1 (2002). Canon 2 states that a judge
238 [Vo1:44
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B. Canon 5 of the Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct
The Minnesota Constitution states that judges "shall be
elected by the voters from the area which they are to serve,"
and that their term of office shall be six years.36 Ethical codes
regulating the campaign activity of judicial candidates have
existed in Minnesota since approximately 1950." Since then,
the codes have been revised based largely on the ABA's 1972
Model Code.3"
Arguably, the most controversial of the Minnesota Judi-
cial Canons is Canon 5.39 Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i) of the Minnesota
Code of Judicial Conduct provides that a judge or a candidate
for judicial office shall not "make pledges or promises of con-
duct in office other than the faithful and impartial perform-
ance of the duties of the office; announce his or her views on
disputed legal or political issues; or misrepresent his or her
identity, qualifications, present position or other fact, or those
of the opponent." ° The controversy surrounding Canon 5 has
shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of the judge's
activities. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 2 (2002). Canon 3 instructs
judges to perform the duties of judicial office impartially and diligently. MODEL
CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3 (2002). Canon 4 requires that a judge mini-
mize the risk of conflict with judicial obligations when engaging in extra-
judicial activities. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 4 (2002). Canon 5
instructs judges to refrain from inappropriate political activity. MODEL CODE
OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 5 (2002).
36. MINN. CONST. 6, § 7.
37. See Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854, 857 (8th Cir.
2001).
38. See id.
39. MINN. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 5.
40. MINN. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i). The full text of
Canon 5 reads as follows:
5. A Judge or Judicial Candidate Shall Refrain From Political Activity
Inappropriate to Judicial Office
A. In General.
Each justice of the supreme court and each court of appeals and district
court judge is deemed to hold a separate nonpartisan office. MS
204B.06 Subd 6.
(1) Except as authorized in Section 5B(1), a judge or a candidate for
election to judicial office shall not:
(a) act as a leader or hold any office in a political organiza-
tion; identify themselves as members of a political or-
240 SANTA CLARA LA W REVIEW [Vol:44
ganization, except as necessary to vote in an election;
(b) publicly endorse or, except for the judge or candidate's
opponent, publicly oppose another candidate for public of-
fice;
(c) make speeches on behalf of a political organization;
(d) attend political gatherings; or seek, accept or use en-
dorsements from a political organization; or
(e) solicit funds for or pay an assessment to or make a con-
tribution to a political organization or candidate, or pur-
chase tickets for political party dinners or other func-
tions.
(2) A judge shall resign the judicial office on becoming a candidate ei-
ther in a primary or in a general election for a non-judicial office,
except that a judge may continue to hold judicial office while being
a candidate for election to or serving as a delegate in a state con-
stitutional convention, if the judge is otherwise permitted by law
to do so.
(3) A candidate for a judicial office, including an incumbent judge:
(a) shall maintain the dignity appropriate to judicial office
and act in a manner consistent with the integrity and in-
dependence of the judiciary, and shall encourage family
members to adhere to the same standards of political
conduct in support of the candidate as apply to the candi-
date;
(b) shall prohibit employees who serve at the pleasure of the
candidate, and shall discourage other employees and offi-
cials subject to the candidate's direction and control from
doing on the candidate's behalf what the candidate is pro-
hibited from doing under the Sections of this Canon;
(c) except to the extent permitted by Section 5B(2), shall not
authorize or knowingly permit any other person to do for
the candidate what the candidate is prohibited from do-
ing under the Sections of this Canon;
(d) shall not: (i) make pledges or promises of conduct in of-
fice other than the faithful and impartial performance of
the duties of the office; announce his or her views on dis-
puted legal or political issues; or misrepresent his or her
identity, qualifications, present position or other fact, or
those of the opponent; and (ii) by words or conduct mani-
fest bias or prejudice inappropriate to judicial office;
(e) may respond to statements made during a campaign for
judicial office within the limitations of Section 5A(3)(d).
B. Judges and Candidates For Public Election.
(1) A judge or a candidate for election to judicial office may, except as
prohibited by law,
(a) speak to gatherings, other than political organization
gatherings, on his or her own behalf.
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focused on whether the Canon violates the First Amendment
of the United States Constitution,' particularly the section
known as the "announce clause,"42 which states that a candi-
(b) appear in newspaper, television and other media adver-
tisements supporting his or her candidacy; and
(c) distribute pamphlets and other promotional campaign
literature supporting his or her candidacy.
(2) A candidate shall not personally solicit or accept campaign contri-
butions or solicit publicly stated support. A candidate may, however,
establish committees to conduct campaigns for the candidate through
media advertisements, brochures, mailings, candidate forums and
other means not prohibited by law. Such committees may solicit and
accept campaign contributions, manage the expenditure of funds for
the candidate's campaign and obtain public statements of support for
his or her candidacy. Such committees are not prohibited from solicit-
ing and accepting campaign contributions and public support from
lawyers, but shall not seek, accept or use political organization en-
dorsements. Such committees shall not disclose to the candidate the
identity of campaign contributors nor shall the committee disclose to
the candidate the identity of those who were solicited for contribution
or stated public support and refused such solicitation. A candidate
shall not use or permit the use of campaign contributions for the pri-
vate benefit of the candidate or others.
C. Incumbent Judges.
A judge shall not engage in any political activity except (1) as author-
ized under any other Section of this Code, (2) on behalf of measures to
improve the law, the legal system or the administration of justice, or
(3) as expressly authorized by law.
D. Political Organization.
For purposes of Canon 5 the term political organization denotes a po-
litical party organization.
E. Applicability.
Canon 1, Canon 2(A), and Canon 5 generally applies to all incumbent
judges and judicial candidates. A successful candidate, whether or not
an incumbent, is subject to judicial discipline for his or her campaign
conduct; an unsuccessful candidate who is a lawyer is subject to lawyer
discipline for his or her campaign conduct. A lawyer who is a candidate
for judicial office is subject to Rule 8.2 of the Minnesota Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct.
Id. Canon 5.
41. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also Kelly,
247 F.3d at 857.
42. MINN. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i).
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date cannot announce his or her views on disputed legal or
political issues.
43
C Republican Party of Minnesota v. Kelly
Republican Party of Minnesota v. Kelly," is the most re-
cent Court of Appeals decision to consider whether the so-
called "announce clause" a violates freedom of speech. 45 The
plaintiff in this case alleged that Canon 5 violated his First
Amendment right to freedom of speech and association as ap-
plied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.46
Applying a strict scrutiny test, 47 the Eighth Circuit upheld
the Canon.48
The plaintiff in Kelly, Gregory Wersal, campaigned for
the office of Associate Justice of the Minnesota Supreme
Court in 1996. 4' That same year, the Minnesota Supreme
Court revised the Code of Judicial Conduct to conform with
the 1990 version of the ABA Model Code.50  Having inter-
preted one of these revisions to lift a previous ban on judicial
candidates speaking at partisan political events,5' Wersal
spoke at Republican party gatherings during his campaign."
At these gatherings, he announced his membership in the
Republican party and his support for a strict constructionist
interpretation of the Constitution. He also distributed cam-
paign literature criticizing several Minnesota Supreme Court
decisions.54
43. Kelly, 247 F.3d at 857.
44. Id. at 854.
45. See Moerke, supra note 26, at 57.
46. Kelly, 247 F.3d at 861.
47. Under strict scrutiny analysis, the government has the burden of prov-
ing that the restriction is (1) narrowly tailored, (2) to serve a compelling state
interest. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 774-75 (2002).
48. See Kelly, 247 F.3d at 867.
49. Id. at 857.
50. Id. at 858.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Kelly, 247 F.3d at 858.
242 [Vo1:44
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Soon thereafter, a delegate to the Republican district
convention filed an ethical complaint against Wersal." The
complaint questioned the appropriateness of Wersal's pres-
ence at the Republican gatherings, as well as the critical
campaign literature.6 The Director of the Lawyers Board,
however, dismissed the complaint, stating that it was uncer-
tain as to whether the Minnesota Supreme Court, in revising
the code, had intended to retain the ban on candidates speak-
ing at political gatherings. 7 In addition, she expressed
doubts about the applicability of the announce clause to Wer-
sal's campaign statements, as well as the enforceability of the
clause."
After receiving notification of the dismissal, Wersal
withdrew his candidacy for the 1996 race. 9 The following
year, however, he announced his candidacy for the upcoming
1998 race.6" The Minnesota Board on Judicial Standards,
which enforces ethical codes against judges, petitioned the
Minnesota Supreme Court to amend Canon 5.61 Specifically,
it wanted to add language that would clarify the ban on judi-
cial candidates speaking at partisan political events, as well
as language prohibiting candidates from identifying them-
selves as members of a particular political group.62 The su-
preme court adopted these recommendations and amended
Canon 5.63
In 1998, Wersal requested an advisory opinion from the
Lawyers Board to determine whether the Board would prose-
55. Id. The complaint was filed with the Office of Lawyers Professional Re-
sponsibility. This office operates under the Minnesota Lawyers Professional
Responsibility Board, and investigates and prosecutes ethical violations of law-
yer candidates for judicial office. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 858-59.
58. Id. at 859. The director cited several decisions from other jurisdictions
in which similar language was interpreted narrowly or struck down. Id.
59. Id.
60. Kelly, 247 F.3d at 859.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
2003] 243
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cute him for ethical violations if he spoke at a political party
gathering or sought a Republican party endorsement.' Wer-
sal also sought an opinion to determine whether the Board
would enforce the Canon 5 provision, which restricted candi-
dates from announcing their views on disputed legal or politi-
cal issues. 5 The Board responded by stating that it would
discipline Wersal if he spoke at partisan gatherings or sought
party endorsements." Regarding the "announce clause," how-
ever, the Board stated that without specific examples of
statements he might make, the Board could not advise him.6
After receiving the advisory opinion, Wersal filed a com-
plaint "seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from the pro-
visions of Canon 5. "68 In the complaint, Wersal alleged that
Canon 5 violated the First Amendment. Ruling in favor of
the defendants, the district court concluded that the State
had a compelling interest in maintaining the independence
and integrity of the judiciary, and these restrictions on candi-
dates' political activities and fund solicitation were narrowly
tailored to serve that interest." Wersal appealed the deci-
sion.7
D. The Eighth Circuit Appeal
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district
court's judgment. 2 The court began by stating that "debate
about the qualifications of candidates for public office is at
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Kelly, 247 F.3d at 859.
67. Id. The Board also indicated that it had serious doubts regarding the
constitutionality of the announce clause. Id.
68. Id. The Republican Party of Minnesota, its affiliated organizations, and
several other individuals and organizations were joined as plaintiffs. Id.
69. Id. at 860.
70. Id. at 873 (stating that the Canon was narrowly tailored because "alter-
native means exist through which voters may obtain information concerning
judicial candidates.").
71. Id. at 861.
72. Kelly, 247 F.3d at 885.
[Vo1:44
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the core of our First Amendment freedoms."" The court then
proceeded to point out the substantial differences between
legislative and executive offices on the one hand, and judicial
office on the other.74 Although in the legislative and executive
arenas the public has a right to know the details of any pro-
posed agendas, the judicial arena differs substantially. 5
Namely, the judicial system is based on interpreting laws en-
acted by other branches of government. 6 According to the
court, a state may conclude that affiliation with a partisan
group should play no part in the neutral decision-making role
of a judge.77 Nevertheless, the court applied a strict scrutiny
test because the public's interest in free speech is great where
"the person subject to restrictions is a candidate for public of-
fice, about whom the public is obliged to inform itself."78
When invoking strict scrutiny analysis, the court must
examine the restriction at issue to determine whether the
state has a compelling interest, and if so, whether the restric-
tion is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.79 In Kelly, the
State asserted an interest in the necessity of restrictions that
would guarantee the impartiality of the Minnesota judiciary
to "preserve the justice of its courts of law and its citizens'
faith in those courts." ° Specifically, the State claimed that
the restriction was necessary in order to prevent candidates
from announcing their views and then, upon taking the
bench, feeling obligated to rule in a manner consistent with
previous statements, thereby denying due process to the par-
ties involved.8' The court declared this a compelling govern-
mental interest.82 Furthermore, the court held that preserv-
73. Id. at 861 (citing Eu v. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 222-23
(1989)).
74. Id. at 862.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Kelly, 247 F.3d at 864.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. ("There is simply no question that a judge's ability to apply the law
2003] 245
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ing the appearance of impartiality, if not actual impartiality,
was also sufficiently compelling." Although the plaintiffs ar-
gued that Minnesota had no compelling interest in an inde-
pendent judiciary because it chose to elect its judges, the
court found no merit in this argument.' Citing a Minnesota
Supreme Court decision,85 the court stated that, regardless of
whether they elect or appoint their judges, the goal of all
states is to create and maintain an impartial and independ-
ent judiciary.86
After determining that the State had a compelling inter-
est, the court discussed whether Canon 5 was narrowly tai-
lored to further that interest. The court concluded that with
respect to prohibition on attending political party gatherings,
party endorsements, party identification, and personal solici-
tation of campaign funds, Canon 5 was narrowly tailored and
necessary to further the State's compelling interest.
The court, however, addressed the announce clause sepa-
rately. The court interpreted the announce clause to "[re-
strain] candidates from making statements in their cam-
paigns about their views on disputed legal and political
issues, and thus [prevent] candidates from implying how they
would decide cases that might come before them as a judge."9"
The plaintiffs contended that this clause was not necessary
because Canon 5 already protects the State's interest by ban-
ning candidates from making pledges or promises while in of-
neutrally is a compelling governmental interest of the highest order.").
83. Id. at 867 ("The governmental interest in an independent and impartial
judiciary is matched by its equally important interest in preserving public con-
fidence in that independence and impartiality.").
84. Kelly, 247 F.3d at 867.
85. Peterson v. Stafford, 490 N.W.2d 418 (Minn. 1992) (holding that the
Minnesota judicial elections procedures are largely designed to protect the in-
dependence of the State's judiciary).
86. See Kelly, 247 F.3d at 885-86.
87. Id. at 867-68.
88. See id. at 868-76, 883-85.
89. See id. at 876.
90. Id. at 877.
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fice.9" The court, however, pointed out that the ban on
pledges or promises does not prevent all actions that could
undercut the State's interest in an independent and impartial
judiciary." The court provided two examples: a declaration
by a candidate that a "hot-button" social issue is or is not con-
stitutional, and a candidate who publicizes his opinion re-
garding the resolution of unsettled legal issues.93 The court
stated that, in situations like these two, candidates would es-
sentially be declaring how they would decide issues that
might come before them as judges in order to gain public
support.94 The difficulty with these situations, the court ex-
plained, is that once a candidate expresses his opinion on an
issue and that same issue later comes before him as a judge,
the individual is placed in an awkward position.95 In other
words, if the judge decides the case consistent with his an-
nouncements, he risks appearing as though he had a bias
prior to ever receiving the case.96 On the other hand, if the
judge decides the case in a manner inconsistent with his can-
didacy statements, the public might view him as a liar.97 Be-
cause a judge should never place himself in such a problem-
atic position, and should freely decide cases consistent with
the law, the court held that the announce clause was neces-
98
sary.
Further, the court held that the announce clause was
narrowly tailored.99 The district court interpreted the an-
nounce clause to apply only to "discussion of a candidate's
predisposition on issues likely to come before the candidate if
91. Kelly, 247 F.3d at 877. Although candidates are generally not permit-
ted to make pledges or promises, they are permitted to pledge faithful perform-
ance of their duties while in office. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See id. at 878.
96. See Kelly, 247 F.3d at 877.
97. See id.
98. See id.
99. See id. at 881.
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elected into office."' ° The court of appeals accepted the lower
court's construction of the clause because the plaintiffs' open-
ing brief did not claim that this interpretation of the clause
was incorrect.' Nevertheless, the court noted that even if the
plaintiffs had raised the issue in their opening briefs, it would
not have found error in the district court's reading of the
clause. 10 2 The district court's reading resulted from a "long-
standing principle that courts should construe laws to sustain
their constitutionality." 3 Consequently, the Eighth Circuit
concluded that the district court correctly interpreted the "an-
nounce clause."0 4
E. The Circuit Split
Prior to Kelly, two other circuit courts issued opinions
regarding similar announce clauses: Stretton v. Disciplinary
Board,0 5 and Buckley v. Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board.06
These decisions illustrated the split among the circuit courts.
In Stretton, the plaintiff sued contending that Canon 7 of
the Pennsylvania Code of Judicial Conduct, which barred ju-
dicial candidates from announcing their views on disputed le-
gal or political issues, violated his First Amendment rights. 107
Applying a strict scrutiny analysis, the court upheld the
Canon.' Like the Eighth Circuit in Kelly, the Third Circuit
indicated that the State had a compelling interest in the in-
tegrity of its judiciary.' °9 In addition, the court held that be-
100. Id.
101. Seeid.
102. Kelly, 247 F.3d at 881.
103. Id. The court also noted that the interpretation accords with the Third
Circuit's interpretation of similar language. Id.
104. Id.
105. Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd., 944 F.2d 137 (3d Cir. 1991).
106. Buckley, 997 F.2d 224, 224 (7th Cir. 1993).
107. Stretton, 944 F.2d at 139-40.
108. Id. at 144.
109. Id. at 141-42. The court stated:
If judicial candidates during a campaign prejudge cases that later come
before them, the concept of impartial justice becomes a mockery. The
ideal of an adjudication reached after a fair hearing, giving due consid-
248 [Vo1:44
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cause the announce clause applied only to issues likely to
come before courts, the clause was narrowly tailored to serve
the State's compelling interest."
In Buckley, however, the Seventh Circuit struck down a
similar announce clause. 1 ' Judge Posner, expressed the need
to reconcile two conflicting principles: "Candidates for public
office should be free to express their views on all matters of
interest to the electorate" and "Judges should decide cases in
accordance with law rather than with any express or implied
commitments that they may have made to their campaign
supporters or to others." 2 Although the court concluded that
judicial impartiality was a compelling interest, it did not find
the announce clause to be narrowly tailored." ' Even though
the district court construed the clause to apply only to state-
ments on issues likely to come before the court, the Seventh
Circuit stated that few issues are not likely to come before a
judge."' As a result, the clause would silence judicial candi-
eration to the arguments and evidence produced by all parties no
longer would apply and the confidence of the public in the rule of law
would be undermined.
The functioning of the judicial system differs markedly from those
of the executive and legislative. In those areas, the public has the right
to know the details of the programs that candidates propose to enact
into law and administer. Pledges to follow certain paths are not only
expected, but are desirable so that voters may make a choice between
proposed agendas that affect the public. By contrast, the judicial sys-
tem is based on the concept of individualized decisions on challenged
conduct and interpretations of law enacted by the other branches of
government.
Id. at 142.
110. Id. at 144.
111. See Buckley v. Ill. Jud. Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224 (7th Cir. 1993).
112. Id. at 227.
113. Seeid.at231.
114. See id. at 229. Judge Posner noted:
There is almost no legal or political issue that is unlikely to come be-
fore a judge of an American court, state or federal, of general jurisdic-
tion. The civil war in Yugoslavia? But we have cases in which Yugo-
slavs resist deportation to that nation on the ground that they face
persecution from one or another side in that nation's multisided civil
war; and some years ago the Illinois courts were embroiled in a custody
fight involving a child who didn't want to return to the then Soviet Un-
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dates' speech on almost any issue. '15 In light of First
Amendment concerns, the court found the clause overbroad."'
F. The Supreme Court Resolves the Circuit Split
In light of the clear split among the circuits, it is no sur-
prise the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White."7 The Court, how-
ever, limited its review to the question of whether prohibiting
a judicial candidate's announcement of his or her views on
disputed legal or political issues violates First Amendment
rights."8 Overturning the ruling in Kelly, the Court held that
judicial impartiality is not a compelling state interest,"9 and
that the clause failed strict scrutiny analysis because it was
"woefully underinclusive."" °
Justice Scalia began his majority opinion by discussing
the State's asserted interest of judicial impartiality. He
posed three possible meanings of the term impartiality and
concluded that, regardless of the definition used, the an-
nounce clause failed a strict scrutiny analysis. 2' First, Scalia
ion with his Soviet parents.
Id.
115. Seeid. at 231. Posner stated:
He can say nothing in public about his judicial philosophy; he cannot,
for example, pledge himself to be a strict constructionist, or for that
matter a legal realist. He cannot promise a better shake for indigent
litigants or harried employers. He cannot criticize Roe v. Wade. He
cannot express his views about substantive due process, economic
rights, search and seizure, the war on drugs, the use of excessive force
by police, the conditions of the prisons, or products liability - or for that
matter about laissez-faire economics, race relations, the civil war in
Yugoslavia, or the proper direction of health-care reform.
Id. at 228.
116. Buckley, 997 F.2d at 231.
117. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002). The name
of this case changed because Suzanne White, the respondent in the case, re-
placed Vera Kelly as Chairperson of the Minnesota Board of Judicial Standards.
See Media Advisory, supra note 25.
118. See White, 536 U.S. at 768.
119. Seeid. at 777.
120. See id. at 780.
121. Seeid. at 775-79.
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stated that one possible meaning of impartiality is a "lack of
bias for or against either party to the proceeding."'22 Tradi-
tionally, the word is used in this manner. 23 However, Scalia
stated that, insofar as the announce clause restricted speech
for or against issues rather than parties, the announce clause
clearly was not narrowly tailored to serve impartiality under
this definition.
24
Scalia indicated that a second possible meaning of impar-
tiality is a "lack of preconception in favor of or against a par-
ticular legal view."' 2' Even under this definition of the word,
Scalia found no compelling interest.'26 He stated, "[a] judge's
lack of predisposition regarding the relevant legal issues in a
case has never been thought a necessary component of equal
justice, and with good reason."12 7  Scalia explained that it
would be virtually impossible, as well as undesirable, to find
a judge who does not have any preconceptions about the law
by the time he arrives at the bench.
128
Although another possible meaning of impartiality is
"open-mindedness,"'29 Scalia stated the Court did not have to
determine whether this was a compelling interest because the
announce clause was "woefully underinclusive" as a means of
achieving that interest. 130 Specifically, the Court found that
the respondents did not satisfy the burden of demonstrating
that statements made during an election campaign are det-
rimental to maintaining an open mind.' The State claimed
122. Id. at 775.
123. Id. at 776.
124. White, 536 U.S. at 776.
125. Id. at 777.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 777-78 (citing Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 835 (1972)).
129. Id. at 778. Scalia explained that open-mindedness differs from simply
having no preconceptions on legal issues, in that it requires a judge to "consider
views that oppose his preconceptions and to remain open to persuasion." Id.
130. White, 536 U.S. at 779-80.
131. Id. at 781. Scalia stated that he could understand that a judge who
makes a campaign promise might be reluctant to later contradict it, and there-
fore threaten open-mindedness on the bench. But he did not feel that a mere
statement of position during a campaign carries the same threat to open-
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that open-mindedness, or the appearance of it, during judicial
campaigns eliminates pressure on a judge to later decide a
case consistent with his earlier announcements.3 2 The prob-
lem, Scalia said, is that judges-to-be make various types of
statements expressing their political or legal viewpoints
throughout the course of their careers; statements made dur-
ing judicial campaigns comprise just a small portion of such
statements. 3 ' Therefore, according to Scalia, if the State's ul-
timate goal is open-mindedness, the prohibition of campaign
statements but no other types of announcements seems un-
reasonable. "
Finally, Scalia stated that although a state has the power
to choose whether or not to elect its judges, it does not have
the power to opt for elections while keeping the voters igno-
rant.'35 As a result, the Court declared the announce clause
unconstitutional. 136
In a concurrence, Justice O'Connor stated that although
she agreed with the majority's First Amendment analysis,
she had concerns about judicial elections generally. 7
O'Connor felt that, aside from concerns regarding the "an-
nounce clause," judicial elections on the whole work to un-
dermine a state's interest in protecting actual and perceived
judicial impartiality.3 8 She explained that it is almost inevi-
table that judges, if subject to regular elections, are "likely to
feel that they have at least some personal stake in the out-
mindedness. Id. at 780.
132. See id. at 778-79.
133. See id at 779.
134. See id. at 779-80. Scalia went on to offer a clarifying example:
In Minnesota, a candidate for judicial office may not say "I think it is
constitutional for the legislature to prohibit same-sex marriages." He
may say the very same thing, however, up until the very day before he
declares himself a candidate, and may say it repeatedly (until litigation
is pending) after he is elected.
Id. at 780.
135. White, 536 U.S. at 788.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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come of every publicized case."'39 In other words, an elected
judge always takes into consideration the notion that an un-
favorable decision could hurt his or her prospects for re-
election. "'
Justice Kennedy also concurred.' He wrote separately
to illustrate his adherence to the view that content-based
speech restrictions are per se invalid unless they fall within
one of the traditional exceptions.12 These exceptions include
speech that is obscene, defamatory, tantamount to an act oth-
erwise criminal, an impairment of some other constitutional
right, an incitement into lawless action, as well as speech
that is calculated or likely to bring about imminent harm.
4 1
The speech in question did not fit into any of these categories,
leading Kennedy to disagree with the Court's inquiry into
compelling governmental interests and narrow tailoring.
4 4
Justices Stevens and Ginsburg each authored dissents.'
Both Justices focused heavily on the differences between leg-
islative and executive elections on the one hand, and judicial
elections on the other.16 Justice Ginsburg stated: "Unlike
their counterparts in the political branches, judges are ex-
pected to refrain from catering to particular constituencies or
committing themselves on controversial issues in advance of
adversarial presentation."'4 7 In addition, she stated that the
majority incorrectly interpreted the announce clause as pro-
hibiting a judicial candidate from stating his or her views on
legal questions.4 8 Rather, she said, the correct construction
of the clause, derived from the lower courts, merely prevents
a candidate from publicly announcing how he or she would
139. Id. at 788-89.
140. Id. at 789.
141. White, 536 U.S. at 792 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
142. See id. at 793.
143. See id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 797, 803.
146. Id. at 797-98, 803.
147. White, 536 U.S. at 803-04 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting).
148. Id. at 809-10.
2003]
SANTA CLARA LA W REVIEW
decide a disputed issue.'
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM
This comment points out the strengths of the majority's
opinion in White, while bringing into focus an issue left unre-
solved by the Supreme Court. Specifically, although the
Court has declared the announce clause of Canon 5 unconsti-
tutional, thereby seemingly preventing the gagging of judicial
candidates, the pledges or promises clause of the Canon re-
mains intact.'5 ° The danger lies in the possibility of overly
broad interpretations of this clause by state courts in the fu-
ture. "' Now that states can no longer prohibit a judicial can-
didate from announcing his or her views on disputed legal or
political issues, a state may achieve the same results by
means of an overly broad or ambiguous interpretation of the
pledges or promises clause.152 This outcome is probable in
light of the broad and ambiguous interpretation given to the
announce clause by the district court and circuit court in
Kelly'. 53  The question then becomes what exactly does
pledges or promises mean. Ambiguous or broad interpreta-
tions of these terms will result in exactly what the White ma-
jority sought to avoid-the silencing of judicial candidates. 154
Furthermore, an overly broad construction of the clause may
present vagueness issues and, therefore, constitutional con-
cerns as well.'55
149. Id. at 809.
150. See generally id at 812 (stating that the pledges or promises clause was
not at issue in White).
151. See generally Baran, supra note 16, at 12 (stating that the pledges or
promises clause poses problems, even in absence of the announce clause).
152. See id.
153. See Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854, 876-83 (8th Cir.
2001); Baran, supra note 16, at 13 ("If judicial commissions apply the pledges or
promises clause as broadly as the Minnesota commission interpreted its an-
nounce clause, it will suffer a similar constitutional fate.").
154. See generally Baran, supra note 16, at 12.
155. Seeid. at 13-14.
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IV. ANALYSIS
A. What Exactly Does the Announce Clause Prohibit?
Scalia's majority opinion in White is convincing in sev-
eral respects. Scalia began his opinion by declaring that the
announce clause "prohibits a judicial candidate from stating
his views on any specific nonfanciful legal questions within
the province of the court for which he is running. ...""' In
her dissent, Ginsburg, however, explained the inaccuracy of
this interpretation of the "announce clause."'57  She stated
that the courts below interpreted the clause as being limited
to barring judicial candidates from publicly making known
how they would decide a disputed issue likely to come before
them as judges. 5 ' Although the phrasing is different, the dis-
tinction is virtually non-existent.' If a court chooses to inter-
pret the term "decide" in a broad or ambiguous way, a candi-
date who announces his "view" on a legal question might be
deemed to have stated how he would "decide" that issue.'
60
Although claiming to construe the clause narrowly, the
Eighth Circuit appeared to interpret it broadly.'6' This inter-
pretation is apparent in the majority's opinion when the
Court stated that the sort of statements that are banned by
the clause are those that "are (or can appear to be) calculated
to show that the candidate will decide cases in a certain way
if elected into office."'62 The use of the wording "or can appear
to be" illustrates the ambiguity of the Court's interpretation
of the clause.'63 For example, a candidate's statement that
156. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 773.
157. Id. at 809 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
158. Id.
159. See generally id. at 774-88 (discussing the overinclusiveness of the an-
nounce clause).
160. See generally Baran, supra note 16, at 13-14 (indicating that the Eighth
Circuit interpreted the announce clause broadly).
161. See generally Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854, 876-83
(8th Cir. 2001).
162. Id. at 882 (emphasis added).
163. Id.
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"rapists deserve the most severe punishment" can be viewed
as tantamount to a statement that the candidate "will give all
rapists the death penalty."" Such vagueness leads to the
problem Posner posed in Buckley-the silencing of judicial
candidates on practically any issue.6 ' Rather than risk ca-
reer-damaging repercussions, a candidate might simply
choose to say nothing at all.'66
B. The Majority Takes a Pragmatic View of Judicial
Elections
The dissent arguably takes an unrealistic view of what is
involved in a judicial election.'67 Both Justice Stevens and
Justice Ginsburg focused a large part of their dissenting opin-
ions on the difference between judicial candidates and all
other candidates for political office.6 8 Justice Ginsburg stated
that although legislative and executive officials serve in rep-
resentative capacities, judges are "not political actors" and,
therefore, must remain impartial.'69
Even though there is no question that judges should re-
main impartial, the meaning of impartiality and the degree
required is not as clear.7 ° This ambiguity is evident in
Scalia's discussion of various possible interpretations of the
term. 7' A candidate who announces a viewpoint on a particu-
lar issue before he takes the bench is not any less impartial
164. See generally id. at 876-83 (discussing what a candidate can and cannot
say while campaigning).
165. See Buckley v. Ill. Jud. Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224, 231 (7th Cir. 1993).
166. See Baran, supra note 16, at 12 (discussing the "rule of silence").
167. Joseph R. Grodin, USC Symposium on Judicial Election, Selection, and
Accountability: Article: Developing a Consensus of Constraint: A Judge's Per-
spective on Judicial Retention Elections, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1969, 1974 (1988)
(indicating that no judge is truly impartial).
168. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. at 797-821 (2002).
169. Id. at 806.
170. Lloyd B. Snyder, The Constitutionality and Consequences of Restric-
tions on Campaign Speech by Candidates for Judicial Office, 35 UCLA L. REV.
207, 226 (1987).
171. See White, 536 U.S. at 775-79.
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than if he had never made the announcement." The minor-
ity disputed the truthfulness of this contention by arguing
that a judge who previously announced his views would have
an interest in ruling consistently with his statement so as to
avoid losing re-election and being called a liar. 3  But
"[e]lected judges--regardless of whether they have announced
any views beforehand--always face the pressure of an elector-
ate who might disagree with their rulings and therefore vote
them off the bench. 174 In other words, the choice not to re-
elect is made because the judge issued an unfavorable ruling,
and not because he issued a ruling inconsistent with his pre-
viously announced views.
7 5
Moreover, an expectation that all judges have no precon-
ceived notions regarding the law is quite unrealistic, and as
Scalia pointed out, undesirable . 6 A judge is often faced with
cases in which the clear language of the Constitution, a stat-
ute, or a common law rule dictates his decision, even though
it is not the answer with which his heart lies. 77 Nonetheless,
a judge's docket is also filled with cases that inevitably re-
quire policy determinations. 8 The idea of "the judge as Her-
cules, eschewing all 'policy' judgments, and searching out and
applying objectively ascertainable 'principles' inherent in the
institutions and enactments of society is ... flawed."'79 Faced
with such policy decisions, it is foreseeable that elements of
the judge's background, beliefs, and morals will play a role in
his resolution of the issues. °
If, for example, an opinion purports to find in the lan-
guage or background of a statute some reflection of legislative
purpose to support a particular interpretation, the possibility
172. See generally id. at 780.
173. See id. at 819.
174. Id. at 782.
175. See generally id.
176. See id. at 778.
177. Grodin, supra note 167, at 1974.
178. Id. at 1975.
179. Id.
180. Id.
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always exists that the reasoning is in whole or in part a ra-
tionalization, conscious or otherwise, for the deeply felt views
of one or more of the signatories.' This unavoidable lack of
complete impartiality serves to reinforce the need for in-
formed voters.' Allowing candidates to speak freely, without
the fear of career damaging complaints, allows voters to make
informed decisions in order to choose a candidate with views
that are compatible with their own beliefs.'83 In reality,
judges are human beings who have personal opinions and at-
titudes about the issues of the day, as do we all. Those atti-
tudes and opinions do have an effect on the way judges trans-
late legislative policy or precedent in particular cases. Judges
are not fungible commodities. Any competent criminal attor-
ney practicing in any court in the country knows which
judges are hard on criminal defendants and which are not. It
is foolish to deny a candidate for judge the opportunity to in-
form the public about the attitudes and views that will influ-
ence the way he will handle cases, if elected. It is self-
deluding not to recognize that the public is well aware that
judges are not fungible."4 The majority's opinion in White
correctly recognized this principle.'85
C. The Role of Third Parties
Additionally, although not discussed by Scalia in his
opinion, third parties play an important role in the need to al-
low the candidates to express their views.8 6 In this media-
intensive era, it is increasingly common for opponents to
criticize candidates of all sorts in advertisements.' 7 As a re-
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1977 (indicating that because judges can never be truly impartial,
the voters should be permitted to hear their views).
183. Snyder, supra note 170, at 235.
184. Id. at 236.
185. See generally Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 768-88
(2002).
186. See generally Baran, supra note 16, at 13 (discussing the role of the me-
dia in judicial elections).
187. See id.
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sult of these advertisements, the true content of a judicial
candidate's platform is likely to become distorted and misun-
derstood.188 If the announce clause were to remain in place,
judicial candidates would have no means by which to respond
truthfully to false allegations. 89 The end result is a confused
and mistaken constituency.' 90
D. The Announce Clause Is Underinclusive
The White majority also correctly concluded that the an-
nounce clause was not narrowly tailored to serve the State's
asserted compelling interest. 1 The clause was underinclu-
sive in that it sought only to prohibit speech by judicial can-
didates during their candidacy. 92 This effect is plainly illogi-
cal if the ultimate goal of the State is to maintain open-
mindedness, or the illusion of it.19' The clause "prohibits one
type of public pronouncement of judicial candidates but ig-
nores numerous other types of public pronouncements that
may have equal or greater impact on judicial impartiality.' 94
For example, a candidate's prior judicial opinions arguably
have the greatest impact on impartiality. 9' Whether declared
in dicta, a dissenting opinion, or a concurrence, these opin-
ions often reveal a great deal about a judge's views on dis-
puted legal or political issues.' 96 Other forms of expression
that are not addressed by the clause include books that the
candidate may have written, classes he may have taught, or a
speech he may have given either as a sitting judge or prior to
any judicial campaign.'97 If speaking out about one's views
188. Id.
189. See Stephen Gillers, "If Elected, I Promise [I"- What Should Judicial
Candidates Be Allowed To Say, 35 IND. L. REV. 725, 730 (2002).
190. See generally id. (discussing the potential confusion that may arise if
judicial candidates cannot respond to false media assertions).
191. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 767 (2002).
192. See id.
193. See id.; see also Snyder, supra note 170, at 230.
194. Snyder, supra note 170, at 230.
195. See id.
196. See id.
197. See id. at 231-32; White, 536 U.S. at 779 (2002).
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during candidacy compromises open-mindedness, then surely
speaking out on any of these occasions has an equivalent ef-
fect.1
98
Furthermore, although not mentioned in White, the
clause seems underinclusive in that it does not forbid indi-
viduals in consideration for appointed judicial offices from
speaking out about disputed legal or political issues.19 9 Both
the announce clause of the Minnesota Code of Judicial Con-
duct and the announce clause of the ABA Model Code of Judi-
cial Conduct only address judicial candidates and incumbent
judges. 00 Arguably, appointed judges will not feel as bound to
public statements made prior to taking the bench since they
will not stand for re-election and, therefore, will not have to
defend their decisions."0 ' However, this argument fails to ac-
count for retention elections in which a judge is appointed
and then must be re-elected for another term.0 These judges
are just as susceptible to feeling pressure to rule in a manner
that is consistent with their prior statements.2 °3
198. See generally Snyder, supra note 170, at 230-34 (noting various ways
candidates-to-be express their views about political and legal topics, other than
speaking out during their candidacy).
199. Id. at 229.
200. MINN. MOD. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i)(2002); MODEL
CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 5 (2002).
201. See generally Deborah Goldberg, In Judicial Elections, Due Process Is
Paramount, Brennan Center for Justice at N.Y.U. School of Law, at
http://www.brennancenter.org/presscenter/oped-2002/oped-2002_0429.html
(Apr. 29, 2002); Snyder, supra note 170, at 229 (indicating that the announce
clause needs to be upheld in order to protect litigants' due process rights).
202. Snyder, supra note 170, at 229-30. Retention elections, also known as
the Missouri Plan, is a system whereby judges are appointed by a high elected
official, and then subsequently stand for unopposed retention elections in which
the voters are asked whether the judges should be recalled. If a judge is re-
called, the vacancy is filled through a new appointment. White, 536 U.S. at
790-91 (citing Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difticulty: Elective Judiciar-
ies and the Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 724 (1995)). Although this sys-
tem may reduce threats to impartiality to a certain extent, it certainly does not
eliminate the problem. Id. at 791 (citing Grodin, supra note 167, at 1980
(1988)).
203. See generally Snyder, supra note 170, at 229-30 (indicating that reten-
tion elections do not eliminate impartiality issues).
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E. The Dangers the Pledges or Promises Clause Presents
Although on its face the White decision appears to have
resolved a much debated constitutional dilemma, the problem
could arise again in the future."°4 Despite the Court's ruling
against the announce clause and in favor of the First
Amendment, the pledges or promises clause remains un-
scathed.2 5 Because this issue did not arise in Kelly or White,
the Court did not address its impact on judicial candidates'
First Amendment rights in the absence of the announce
clause. °6
The pledges or promises clause forbids a judicial candi-
date from pledging or promising certain results if he or she is
elected as a judge.27 For example, a judicial candidate may
not say: "If elected into office, I promise to overturn the hold-
ing reached in Smith v. Johnson.""' To allow a candidate to
do so would allow him to commit himself to a particular reso-
lution regardless of the facts or law before him.2 9
Judges decide cases at the end of a formal process that
envisions, among other things, rules of evidence, standards of
advocacy, opposing arguments, deliberation, and a mind open
to persuasion. This is the process litigants are due. A com-
mitment to decide a particular case in a particular way is the
antithesis of the judicial process.'
The denial of due process in such a situation is of particu-
lar concern. 1' With such a compelling interest, thus far the
pledges or promises clause has passed constitutional scru-
tiny.212
204. See generally Baran, supra note 16, at 13-14 (discussing the potential
problems the pledges or promises clause may cause).
205. See generally White, 536 U.S. at 780 (stating that the pledges or prom-
ises clause was not at issue in the Court's decision).
206. Id.
207. See MINN. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i) (2001).
208. See generally White, 536 U.S. at 809-11 (clarifying what a judicial can-
didate can and cannot say under the announce clause).
209. See id. at 813.
210. Gillers, supra note 189, at 726.
211. Seeid. at 725-26.
212. See generally id. (indicating that the pledges or promises clause is nec-
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The question becomes, however, what effect the absence
of the announce clause will have on the pledges or promises
clause."3 Without the announce clause, judicial commissions
and courts may attempt to gag judicial candidates via a broad
and ambiguous interpretation of the pledges or promises
clause."4 Given the Minnesota commission's and the Eighth
Circuit's broad interpretation of the announce clause,2 5 this
situation is quite likely to occur. 216 A broad interpretation of
the pledges or promises clause may lead to the labeling of an
announcement as a pledge or promise.217
For example, a judge in Texas was issued a public warn-
ing for stating in his campaign literature: "I am very tough on
crimes where there are victims who have been physically
harmed .... I have no feelings for the criminal., 21'8 The Texas
Commission on Judicial Conduct stated that it considered
this a pledge to show no mercy toward violent criminals.1 9
Likewise, in New York, a judge was censured for pointing out
during his campaign that he was once a tenant and that his
opponent was a landlord. 2 ° He also used statements made by
tenants which praised his resolution of housing disputes.
The Commission held that this violated the pledges or prom-
ises clause because it gave the "impression" that, as a judge,
essary to protect litigants' due process rights).
213. See generally Baran, supra note 16, at 12 (stating that the pledges or
promises clause poses problems, even in the absence of an announce clause).
214. See id.
215. See Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854, 876-83 (8th Cir.
2001); Baran, supra note 16, at 13 ("If judicial commissions apply the pledges or
promises clause as broadly as the Minnesota commission interpreted its an-
nounce clause, it will suffer a similar constitutional fate.").
216. SeeBaran, supra note 16, at 12.
217. See, e.g., id. at 13 (demonstrating that a concrete distinction between a
pledge and a promise is not easily drawn).
218. Id. (citing Bruce Hight, Judge Violated Conduct Code, Panel Decides,
AUSTIN AM. STATESMAN, Jan. 31, 2001).
219. Baran, supra note 16, at 13 (questioning whether the judge was pledg-
ing or whether he was announcing his view on the legal issue of whether there
should be tough sentencing of violent criminals).
220. Id. (citing Matter of Arthur Birnbaum a Judge of the Civil Court of the
City of New York, New York County, 218 N.Y.L.J. 1, 13 (1997)).
221. Baran, supra note 16, at 13.
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he would favor tenants over landlords in housing disputes.222
Are these really pledges or promises, or are they an-
nouncements?22  Where is the line drawn?24  More impor-
tantly, how does a candidate know where the line is drawn?225
Such broad and ambiguous interpretations of the pledges
or promises clause may continue to silence judicial candi-
dates-a problem that White sought to eliminate. 226 As with
the announce clause, if candidates are unsure whether a
statement classifies as a pledge or promise, they are likely to
say nothing at ally.22  This result is possible even if their
statement would have been permissible under the clause.228
Additionally, "if judicial commissions apply the 'pledges
or promises' clause as broadly as the Minnesota commission
interpreted its 'announce clause,' it will suffer a similar con-
stitutional fate."229 Specifically, the vagueness of the clause,
especially if enforced unevenly, may well cause a court to de-
clare it unconstitutional.2 °
222. Id. (citing Matter ofArthurBirnbaum, 218 N.Y.L.J. at 13).
223. See generally id. (questioning what constitutes a pledge or a promise).
224. See generally Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 819
(2002) (indicating that the line between what is an announcement and what is a
promise to rule a certain way is not so clear).
225. Justice Ginsburg alluded to the lack of clarity regarding where to draw
the line in her White dissent. See id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Arguing the
necessity of the announce clause, she stated: "Uncoupled from the Announce
Clause, the ban on pledges or promises is easily circumvented." Id. at 819. She
continued to explain that without the announce clause acting as a check, candi-
dates can easily make pledges or promises without actually using those words.
Id. at 819-20.
226. See generally Baran, supra note 16, at 12.
227. Id. ("Candidates, including Wersal, succumb to the 'rule of silence'
rather than risk complaints and the resulting damage to their careers. It is
precisely this Dickensian type of gamesmanship by disciplinary committees
that may result in additional First Amendment court decisions striking down
'pledges and promises' provisions.").
228. Moerke, supra note 26, at 56-57 (discussing the effects of the rule of si-
lence).
229. Baran, supra note 16, at 13.
230. Id. at 13-14 (noting that in order to uphold the constitutionality of the
pledges or promises clause, "state supreme courts will have to grapple with de-
fining the remainder of Canon 5 to give candidates sufficient clarity while ac-
knowledging that candidates have a constitutional right to discuss political and
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V. PROPOSAL
If commissions and courts interpret the pledges or prom-
ises clause broadly, the First Amendment problems presented
by the announce clause are likely to persist even in its ab-
sence."' Furthermore, due to the vagueness concerns it pre-
sents, a court will likely hold the pledges or promises clause
unconstitutional.2"2 To circumvent this dilemma, state su-
preme courts will have to devise a viable definition of
"pledges or promises" to provide clarity to judicial candidates,
while taking into account a candidate's right to discuss mat-
ters of political and legal importance.233
A. Defining Pledges or Promises so as to Comport with the
White Decision
Undisputedly, a judge is restricted from pledging or
promising to rule a certain way on a particular issue when he
takes the bench.234 The question, however, becomes how to
word the clause so as not to encompass unrestricted speech.
23 15
To solve this problem, the courts could define pledges or
promises as those statements that commit or appear to com-
mit the candidate in advance with respect to any particular
case or controversy or which suggest that, if elected, the judge
would administer his or her office with partiality, bias, or fa-
vor. 236  To a certain extent, this rule precludes many an-
nouncements that do not commit a candidate to a particular
ruling or exhibit any bias from being labeled as a pledge or a
legal issues.").
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. See Cotilla & Veal, supra note 31, at 748-49 (noting the necessity of the
pledges or promises clause in preventing candidates from making promises that
may compromise their judicial independence).
235. See Baran, supra note 16, at 13; Matthew J. O'Hara, Restriction of Ju-
dicial Election Candidates' Free Speech Rights After Buckley: A Compelling
Constitutional Limitation 70 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 197, 235 (1994).
236. This definition is very similar to a rule adopted by the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court, which is not based on the Model Penal Code. See WIS. SCR 60.06
(2002).
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promise."' To violate the rule, the candidate must essentially
guarantee that he will rule a particular way on a particular
issue; general or vague declarations of views will not consti-
238tute a violation.
This rule has its own difficulties, however, given that the
phrases "appear to commit" and "suggest" are vague as well.
Viewed subjectively, almost any statement expressing a view
can be said to "appear to commit" a candidate or "suggest"
bias. Potentially, such a view could result in the silencing
sought to be avoided. 239 Therefore, in order for this rule to
remain viable, courts must interpret these terms narrowly
and consistently, as well as view candidates' statements ob-
jectively. 240 This may prove to be a daunting task.4
B. Candidates May Have to Dodge Questions
Judicial candidates will also have to struggle to avoid the
aggrandizement of their new found freedom.242 As Jan Baran
has said, "[ilt is one thing to have freedom of speech. What to
say is something else. 243  Regardless of the way in which
committees and courts choose to define "pledges or promises,"
candidates must realize that their freedom is not absolute.244
Accordingly, they will have to take great care to ensure that
their statements are not construed as pledging or promising a
particular outcome.24 Thus, they may have to evade ques-
237. SeegenerallyO'Hara, supra note 235, at 235.
238. See generally id. (discussing the practicality of Wisconsin's pledges or
promises rule).
239. See Buckley v. Ill. Jud. Inquiry Bd., 997. F.2d 224, 229 (7th Cir. 1993)
(discussing the problems raised by silencing judicial candidates).
240. See Baran, supra note 16, at 13 ("The vagueness of the 'pledges and
promises' clause could be compounded by uneven or sweeping enforcement.").
241. See id. at 14.
242. See id.
243. Id.
244. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 813 (2002) (indi-
cating that whatever the validity of the announce clause, a state may constitu-
tionally prohibit judicial candidates from pledging or promising certain results).
245. See Baran, supra note 16, at 14.
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tions that call for very specific answers.246 For example, when
asked what his position is on a particular issue, a candidate
may have to respond that he believes it inappropriate for a
judicial candidate to state his position regarding that issue
because the same issue may appear before him as a judge."
Although statements such as this serve to safeguard the ap-
pearance of impartiality, they do not necessarily leave the
public ignorant."4 Individuals can almost always resort to
other sources, such as the candidate's prior opinions or arti-
cles in order to unveil the candidate's positions on issues of
importance.249
C. The Elimination of Judicial Elections
So long as we have judicial elections, the problems pre-
sented, while mitigable, are virtually inescapable. 5 ° Apart
from announcements or promises, elected judges will always
feel the weight of the public when ruling.251 "Elected judges
cannot help being aware that if the public is not satisfied
with the outcome of a particular case, it could hurt their re-
election prospects." '252 The only way to eliminate pressure on
judges is to do away with judicial elections.253 In the after-
math of White, the ABA, long opposed to judicial elections,254
will likely push this proposition.255 However, due to public in-
246. See id.
247. Id. ("This type of response at times may not be possible, or may require
further explanation with some 'neutral' comment about 'issue X."').
248. See Snyder, supra note 170, at 230.
249. See id.
250. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002); see
also Baran, supra note 16, at 14.
251. See White, 536 U.S. at 789.
252. Id.
253. Id.; see also O'Hara, supra note 235, at 235.
254. See White, 536 U.S. at 787; see also Linda Greenhouse, Justices Strike
Down Minnesota Law Prohibiting Political Statements by Judicial Candidates,
N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2002, at A24. Since 1972, the ABA has continuously sub-
mitted recommendations to the House of Delegates stating its preference for
merit selection and encouraging bar associations to work towards the adoption
of such a system.
255. See Cotilla & Veal, supra note 31, at 754.
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sistence on popular elections for the past two centuries,256
"merit selection"257 seems unlikely.
VI. CONCLUSION
The announce clause has been a point of contention for
several years. 259 The Supreme Court has finally resolved the
debate by declaring the clause unconstitutional.26 ° This rul-
ing is certainly "an important victory for the First Amend-
ment and for the free speech rights of judicial candidates. 26'
Although judicial impartiality is important to a certain
extent, complete impartiality, while ideal, is unrealistic.
262
Judges are frequently faced with policy decisions, and inevi-
tably will rely on their backgrounds and philosophies to make
decisions.263 One must acknowledge that these judicial pre-
conceptions of the law are unyielding and, in turn, allow the
264blindfold to be removed from the voters' eyes.
Although the holding in White has seemingly allowed us
to overcome this impasse, we must be wary of the possibility
of vague and broad interpretations of the pledges or promises
clause.265 Such interpretations have the potential to render
White meaningless.2 6  Avoiding this possibility necessitates a
256. See Baran, supra note 16, at 14.
257. This term should be used loosely. Although appointment systems are
often referred to as "merit systems," judicial appointments are not always based
on merit. See generally Snyder, supra note 170, at 254 (generally discussing
what is involved in appointment systems).
258. See Baran, supra note 16, at 14.
259. See generally White, 536 U.S. at 768; Republican Party of Minn. v.
Kelly, 247 F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 2001); Buckley v. Ill. Jud. Inquiry Bd., 997. F.2d
224 (7th Cir. 1993); Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd., 944 F.2d 137 (3d Cir. 1991).
260. See White, 536 U.S. at 788.
261. ACMJ Calls Supreme Court Decision on Judicial Candidates Important
Victory for Free Speech, Brennan Center for Justice at N.Y.U. School of Law, at
http://www.aclj.org/news/pressreleases/020627-freespeech.asp (June 27, 2002)
(quoting Jay Sekulow).
262. See Grodin, supra note 167, at 1974 (indicating that no judge is truly
impartial).
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. See Baran, supra note 16, at 14.
266. See generally id. (indicating that the pledges or promises clause threat-
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narrow reading of the pledges or promises clause by courts
and judicial commissions.267 However, even this is not fool-
proof.268 The only way to achieve the utmost level of imparti-
ality is to eliminate judicial elections entirely.269 Although not
likely to occur in the near future, it is an option worth
considering!7
ens prohibited speech that White sought to protect).
267. See id.
268. See infra Part V.A.
269. See White, 536 U.S. at 790; O'Hara, supra note 235, at 235.
270. See Baran, supra note 16, at 14.
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